Technology sharing and tacit collusion
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References listed on IDEAS
- Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
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- Jorde, Thomas M & Teece, David J, 1990. "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 75-96, Summer.
- Baumol, William J., 2001. "When is inter-firm coordination beneficial? The case of innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 727-737, April.
- Kaz Miyagiwa, 2009. "COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 768-784, December.
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- repec:eee:indorg:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:78-106 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:indorg:v:53:y:2017:i:c:p:1-31 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aguiar, Luis & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2017.
"European cooperative R&D and firm performance: Evidence based on funding differences in key actions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-31.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2017. "European cooperative R&D and firm performance: Evidence based on funding differences in key actions," Post-Print halshs-01630665, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsCollusion; Technology sharing; Research joint ventures; Licensing;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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