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Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: Prompt Corrective Action

  • J-P. Niinimaki

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    The paper investigates the optimal design of bank bailouts. Under three types of ex post moral hazard that tempt banks to hide loan losses, the paper analyzes banking regulation via three Prompt Corrective Action instruments: prohibition of dividends, limits on compensation to managers and early closure policy. The first two have a mitigating effort on moral hazard but the last instrument has a damaging impact. As to bad debts and the cleaning of banks' balance sheets, asset insurance and equity capital motivate banks to disclose loan losses. In some cases, prohibition of dividends or limits on compensation to managers has the same effect.

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    File URL: http://www.ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp69.pdf
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    Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 69.

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    Length: 54
    Date of creation: Nov 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp69
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    Web page: http://ace-economics.fi

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    1. Hyytinen, Ari & Takalo, Tuomas, 2003. "Preventing systemic crises through bank transparency," Research Discussion Papers 25/2003, Bank of Finland.
    2. Kim, Moshe & Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard & Vale, Bent, 2005. "Endogenous product differentiation in credit markets: What do borrowers pay for?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 681-699, March.
    3. Fabio Panetta & Thomas Faeh & Giuseppe Grande & Corrinne Ho & Michael King & Aviram Levy & Federico M. Signoretti & Marco Taboga & Andrea Zaghini, 2009. "An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 47, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. Hasan, Iftekhar & Wall , Larry D., 2003. "Determinants of the loan loss allowance: some cross-country comparisons," Research Discussion Papers 33/2003, Bank of Finland.
    5. Leslie Teo & Charles Enoch & Carl-Johan Lindgren & Tomás J. T. Baliño & Anne Marie Gulde & Marc Quintyn, 2000. "Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring; Lessons from Asia," IMF Occasional Papers 188, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 9158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    8. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007. "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England.
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