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Misreporting in the Value-Added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement

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  • Hoseini, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

A common fraud by registered traders in the value-added tax system is under-reporting sales and over-reporting purchases. This paper models this problem by linking the level of misreporting to the risk-aversion of taxpayers and the level of transactions with final consumers. In addition, it analyses the enforcement consequences of the new developments in information reporting and electronic invoicing, which enable the tax authority to randomly cross-check the invoices. The results highlight the importance of taxpayer’s subjective beliefs in shaping audit policy of the tax authority. The optimal audit rate for risk-neutral firms is an increasing function of transaction with final consumers, but this relationship may turn to be negative for risk-averse taxpayers. Moreover, the optimal level of invoice cross-checking on transactions of each commodity is positively associated with the number of trading firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoseini, M., 2014. "Misreporting in the Value-Added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement," Discussion Paper 2014-061, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b8a0a931-1092-4c98-bd36-4ef6f1f08d03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 651-692, May.
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    15. Hoseini, Mohammad, 2015. "Value-Addes Tax and Shadow Economy : the Role of Input-Output Linkages (revision of CentER Discussion Paper 2013-036)," Discussion Paper 2015-058, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoseini, Mohammad, 2015. "Value-Addes Tax and Shadow Economy : the Role of Input-Output Linkages (revision of CentER Discussion Paper 2013-036)," Discussion Paper 2015-058, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    value-added tax; tax evasion; information reporting; predictive analytics;

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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