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Measuring trust, reciprocity and altruism by counterfactuals

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  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni
  • Papa Stefano

Abstract

Our paper aims to investigate conditional and unconditional motivations in investment games by using a counterfactual methodology and attitudinal survey and self-reported information about participants’ behavior. We have combined different methodologies to verify the coherence between participants’ actions, beliefs and perceptions

Suggested Citation

  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2013. "Measuring trust, reciprocity and altruism by counterfactuals," wp.comunite 0099, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0099
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences; triadic approach; investment game; frame effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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