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Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts

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  • James Cox

Abstract

Trust and reciprocity have been observed in experiments with simple stylized games. Such characteristics of social preferences have been observed to vary with procedures that alter the social environment in an experiment, such as single blind or double blind payoff protocols. This paper reports an experiment on the effects of a change in the social context of an experiment on trust and reciprocity. The strong social context introduces a stylized version of a characteristic of everyday life in large cities: a player in one game knows that other games lie ahead but does not know precisely what those games will turn out to be nor with whom they will be played.

Suggested Citation

  • James Cox, 2009. "Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(2), pages 89-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:43:y:2009:i:2:p:89-104 DOI: 10.1080/00779950903005473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Revealed Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 31-69, January.
    2. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
    3. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 17-45.
    4. James Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 1-24.
    5. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Halladay, Brianna, 2016. "Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 141-150.
    2. Giovanni Bartolomeo & Stefano Papa, 2016. "Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 100-115.
    3. Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.
    4. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Li, Yaxiong & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud, 2016. "What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 117-135.
    5. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2013. "Measuring trust, reciprocity and altruism by counterfactuals," wp.comunite 0099, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    6. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2012. "The triadic design to identify trust and reciprocity: Extensions and robustness," wp.comunite 0096, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.

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    Keywords

    experiments; trust; reciprocity; social context;

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