Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts
Trust and reciprocity have been observed in experiments with simple stylized games. Such characteristics of social preferences have been observed to vary with procedures that alter the social environment in an experiment, such as single blind or double blind payoff protocols. This paper reports an experiment on the effects of a change in the social context of an experiment on trust and reciprocity. The strong social context introduces a stylized version of a characteristic of everyday life in large cities: a player in one game knows that other games lie ahead but does not know precisely what those games will turn out to be nor with whom they will be played.
Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RNZP20|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cox, J. & Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S., 2006.
"A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1181, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA.
- James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2006. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- James C. Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Vjollca, .
"Implications of Trust, Fear, and Reciprocity for Modeling Economic Behavior,"
Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series
2006-10, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- James Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
- Jim C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2005.
784828000000000595, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Sadiraj, Vjollca, 2009. "Revealed Altruism," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6rb5t4mc, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj, . "Revealed Altruism," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Jul 2007.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:43:y:2009:i:2:p:89-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.