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The Legal Framework for Effective Corporate Governance: Comparative Analysis of Provisions in Selected Transition Economies

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  • Iraj Hashi

Abstract

The development of market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, and the imminent accession of some of these countries to EU membership, has only strengthened the view that corporate governance is of fundamental importance to the process of transition and to the economic regeneration and growth of former socialist countries. The paper identifies the differences between the systems of corporate governance existing in various transition countries. It aims at comparing the legal framework for corporate governance in selected transition economies in order to highlight the progress made so far as well as the shortcomings of the existing framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Iraj Hashi, 2003. "The Legal Framework for Effective Corporate Governance: Comparative Analysis of Provisions in Selected Transition Economies," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0268, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0268
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    5. Cadbury, Adrian, 2002. "Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199252008.
    6. Iraj Hashi, 1997. "Mass Privatisation and Corporate Governance in the Czech Republic," Working Papers 003, Staffordshire University, Business School.
    7. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2003. "Mass Privatisation, Corporate Governance and Endogenous Ownership Structure," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-596, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
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    10. Roman Frydman & Edmund S. Phelps & Andrzej Rapaczynski & Andrei Shleifer, 1993. "Needed mechanisms of corporate governance and finance in Eastern Europe1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(2), pages 171-207, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Heinrich & Aleksandra Lis & Heiko Pleines, 2007. "Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in post-Socialist Companies: an Analytical Framework," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp896, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

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