On the relationship between keynes´s conception of evidential weight and the ellsberg paradox
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- Feduzi, Alberto, 2007. "On the relationship between Keynes's conception of evidential weight and the Ellsberg paradox," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 545-565, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Feduzi, Alberto, 2010. "On Keynes's conception of the weight of evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 338-351, November.
- Ronald Schettkat, 2018. "Revision or Revolution? A Note on Behavioral vs. Neoclassical Economics," Schumpeter Discussion Papers sdp18005, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
- Alberto Feduzi, 2010. "On Keynes's conception of the Weight of Evidence," Post-Print hal-00870185, HAL.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2007-03-24 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2007-03-24 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2007-03-24 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2007-03-24 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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