The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics
This paper addresses the claim that L. J. Savage's account of subjective utility theory models beliefs for all rational agents. Proposals for a two-dimensional model of belief are discussed and sources of criticism of subjective utility theory as a theory of rational choice are categorized. A theory of rational choice is proposed that gives conditions under which choices (including those made by "uncertainty" averters) can be judged to be rational. The paper corroborates A. K. Sen's findings, which show that rationality is not a behavioral entity. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 43 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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