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Irregular Migration: Incentives and Institutional and Social Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandra Venturini

Abstract

National and international migration laws determine the legal or illegal status of a migrant. For any given legislation the number of illegal migrants depends on the social-political and economic conditions of the sending countries and on the organizations which favour frontier transit, but also on push-pull forces in the host countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandra Venturini, 2009. "Irregular Migration: Incentives and Institutional and Social Enforcement," RSCAS Working Papers carim2009/03, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:carim2009/03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    2. Blume, Lawrence, 2002. "Stigma and Social Control," Economics Series 119, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yulia Vymyatnina & Evgeniya Goryacheva, 2014. "Monetary Policy Rules in the Countries of the Customs Union," EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series Ec-05/14, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.

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