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Irregular Migration: Incentives and Institutional and Social Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandra Venturini

Abstract

National and international migration laws determine the legal or illegal status of a migrant. For any given legislation the number of illegal migrants depends on the social-political and economic conditions of the sending countries and on the organizations which favour frontier transit, but also on push-pull forces in the host countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandra Venturini, 2009. "Irregular Migration: Incentives and Institutional and Social Enforcement," RSCAS Working Papers carim2009/03, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:carim2009/03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    2. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    3. Blume, Lawrence, 2002. "Stigma and Social Control," Economics Series 119, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yulia Vymyatnina & Evgeniya Goryacheva, 2014. "Monetary Policy Rules in the Countries of the Customs Union," EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series Ec-05/14, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.

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