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Structural Alternatives to the Tax Administration
[Структурные Альтернативы Налогового Администрирования]

Author

Listed:
  • Belev, Sergei (Белев, Сергей)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Zolotareva, Anna (Золотарев, Анна)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Malayrev, Aleksandr (Малайрев, Александр)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Sokolov, Ilya (Соколов, Илья)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

This study analyzes several structural alternatives of tax administration in terms of contracts design for tax officers. Particularly, it considers pros and cons of using different efficiency indicators within an efficient contract framework. To understand, which indicators can be used in practice, there has been conducted an analysis of official documents. Since it is not explicitly stated in official data which indicators are used, econometric methods can be viewed as an alternative approach to figure out the presence of relationship between the wage fund and its possible determinants. Overall, the results indicate that the salaries level depends on revenues from taxes and fines, as well as additional revenues from field checks along with expenditures from tax proceeding revisions by courts, ceteris paribus. The estimated effects of these variables constitute only minor fraction of wage payments.

Suggested Citation

  • Belev, Sergei (Белев, Сергей) & Zolotareva, Anna (Золотарев, Анна) & Malayrev, Aleksandr (Малайрев, Александр) & Sokolov, Ilya (Соколов, Илья), 2015. "Structural Alternatives to the Tax Administration [Структурные Альтернативы Налогового Администрирования]," Published Papers mn13, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ppaper:mn13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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