From privatized to government-administered tax collection: tax farming in eighteenth-century France -super-1
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- Mikael Priks, 2005. "Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France â€“ Default Risk and Monitoring Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1464, CESifo Group Munich.
- Noel D., Johnson & Mark, Koyama, 2012. "Standardizing the fiscal state: cabal tax farming as an Intermediate Institution in early-modern England and France," MPRA Paper 40403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Khan, Adnan Q. & Khwaja, Asim I. & Olken, Benjamin A., 2016. "Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66265, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Belev, Sergei & Zolotareva, Anna & Malayrev, Aleksandr & Sokolov, Ilya, 2015. "Structural Alternatives to the Tax Administration," Published Papers mn13, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
- David R Stead, "undated". "Fixed Rent Contracts in English Agriculture, 1750-1850: A Conjecture," Discussion Papers 05/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Poitras, Geoffrey & Geranio, Manuela, 2016. "Trading of shares in the Societates Publicanorum?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 95-118.
- Sutirtha Bagchi, 2017. "Does the Strength of Incentives Matter for Elected Officials? A Look at Tax Collectors," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 34, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
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