Tax Collection in History
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More about this item
KeywordsTax collecting; tax farming; share contracts; rent contracts; wage contracts;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
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