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Does the Strength of Incentives Matter for Elected Officials? A Look at Tax Collectors

Author

Listed:
  • Bagchi Sutirtha

    (Department of Economics, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA)

Abstract

In Pennsylvania local property taxes are collected by elected officials, known as tax collectors, whose compensation varies widely in both structure and level across municipalities. This paper analyses the existence of a pay-performance relationship for these officials. Using data on the percentage of property taxes that are actually collected at the municipal level, the paper finds that as the compensation tax collectors receive goes up, they collect more in taxes. This relationship is however true only for collectors who are compensated on a commission basis and not for collectors compensated on the basis of a flat salary.

Suggested Citation

  • Bagchi Sutirtha, 2021. "Does the Strength of Incentives Matter for Elected Officials? A Look at Tax Collectors," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(3), pages 967-1012, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:21:y:2021:i:3:p:967-1012:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2020-0008
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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