Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis
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More about this item
KeywordsL44 H11 H41 K21 D82 Private and public enforcement Antitrust laws Strategic abuse Free-riding Information revelation Social welfare;
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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