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- Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 2005. "Illinois Walls," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-049/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Schinkel Maarten Pieter & RÃ¼ggeberg Jakob & Tuinstra Jan, 2003. "Illinois Walls," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
- Hugh C. Briggs III & Kathleen D. Huryn & Mark E. McBride, 1996. "Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 770-786, Winter.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Salant, Stephen W, 1987. "Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1326-1336, December.
- Baker, Jonathan B, 1988. "Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 385-408, Fall.
- McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-350, April.
- Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347-347.
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- F. M. Scherer, 1997. "How US Antitrust Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 239-256.
- Snyder, Edward A, 1985. "Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 469-482, May.
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- Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 2008.
"Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 683-698.
- RÃ¼ggeberg, J. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2005. "Illinois Walls: How barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2012. "The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 265-276.
More about this item
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
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