Public and Private Enforcement of Law under the High Risk of Type I Errors: the Russian Case
The authors explain comparative advantages of public enforcement of legislation by public authority by means of control and supervision, on the one hand, and private enforcement, on the other hand, in consumer protection law, labor law and antitrust law in Russia. Along with private and "pure" public enforcement we analyze selective public enforcement as a specific enforcement model. Selective public enforcement may be individually preferable in comparison with private enforcement, but the use of this model in certain circumstances decreases deterrence effect due to an increase of the probability of Type I errors (punishment of the innocents) and underperforms both private and "pure" public enforcement.
Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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