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Competition Restriction Problem in the Markets Linked to the Markets of Essential Facilities

Author

Listed:
  • Golovanova, S.

    (National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia)

Abstract

Theoretical background for reasons that cause the owner of essential facilities to restrict competition in downstream markets provided. Examining the particular Russian antitrust cases the author discusses whether the essential facilities doctrine may be helpful to solve the problem. While the doctrine seems to be quite efficient when considering infrastructure industries its use in other cases is disputable due to the high risk of type I errors (punishment of the innocents).

Suggested Citation

  • Golovanova, S., 2013. "Competition Restriction Problem in the Markets Linked to the Markets of Essential Facilities," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 110-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2013:i:20:p:110-132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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