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Law And Economics Of Antitrust Enforcement In Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Svetlana Avdasheva

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies. Deputy Director;)

  • Polina Kryuchkova

    (2National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, Laboratory of Competition and Antimonopoly Policy. Leading Research Fellow;)

Abstract

Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Avdasheva & Polina Kryuchkova, 2013. "Law And Economics Of Antitrust Enforcement In Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:05/pa/2013
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    File URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/10/24/1279815678/05PA2013.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Svetlana B. Avdasheva & Dina V. Tsytsulina, 2014. "The Effects Of Competition Policy: Merger Approval, Entry Barrier Removal, Antitrust Enforcement Compared," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/FE/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; Russia; public enforcement; complaints; legal errors.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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