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Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Matteo Rizzolli

Abstract

The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 224-231, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201206)168:2_224:wcdld_2.0.tx_2-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shastitko. Andrey & Golovanova, S. V., 2016. "The Role of the Mediator in Complex Capital Projects," Working Papers 1449, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    2. Natalia Pavlova & Andrey Shastitko, 2014. "Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements," HSE Working papers WP BRP 58/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. repec:nos:vgmu00:2017:i:3:p:51-71 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:rujoec:v:2:y:2016:i:4:p:375-401 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Shastitko, Andrei & Golovanova, Svetlana, 2016. "The mediator - not what you think (for economic policy lessons)," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 43-60, February.
    6. Šastitko, Andrej E., 2013. "Effects of third party errors," EconStor Preprints 121747, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    7. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Shastitko, Andrei, 2015. "Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 72-91, February.
    8. Shastitko, Andrey, 2014. "Effects of the Third Party Errors," Published Papers re9021, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    9. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    10. repec:eee:jcecon:v:46:y:2018:i:1:p:284-307 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Mungan, Murat C., 2014. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 189-197.
    12. Mungan, Murat C., 2015. "Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 79-87.
    13. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    14. Svetlana Avdasheva & Polina Kryuchkova, 2013. "Law And Economics Of Antitrust Enforcement In Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. repec:scn:vgmu00:2017:i:3:p:51-71 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Andrei Y. Shastitko & Svetlana V. Golovanova, 2014. "Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 49/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    17. Svetlana B. Avdasheva & Dina V. Tsytsulina, 2014. "The Effects Of Competition Policy: Merger Approval, Entry Barrier Removal, Antitrust Enforcement Compared," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/FE/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    18. Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    19. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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