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Private vs Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile

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  • Aldo González
  • Alejandro Micco

Abstract

This article measures the impact of the agency responsible for enforcing competition law, in the outcome of antitrust trials in Chile. Using statistics on lawsuits since the inception of the new Competition Tribunal in 2004, we find that the involvement of the public agency increases the probability of obtaining a guilty verdict in an antitrust lawsuit by 40 percentage points. Conditional to the issuance of a verdict, the participation of the prosecutor raises the likelihood of a conviction by 38 percentage points. The results are robust to possible selection bias by the public agency. The prosecutor is inclined to takes part in cases involving sensitive markets and in accusations of collusion. The State-related character of the accused entity, in addition to its size, does not affect the probability of intervention by the prosecutor in a lawsuit.

Suggested Citation

  • Aldo González & Alejandro Micco, 2013. "Private vs Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile," Working Papers wp378, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp378
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    File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private-vs-public-antitrust-enforcement-evidence-from-chile
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    1. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
    2. R. Preston McAfee & Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2005. "Private Versus Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis," Emory Economics 0523, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
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