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Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union – Comments on a Roadmap


  • Ansgar Belke


The Van Rompuy Report and also additional proposals made by the European Commission outlined steps for a ‘genuine Economic and Monetary Union’. This article explains, assesses and comments on the proposals made. Moreover, it outlines what could be recommendations in order to achieve a ‘genuine Economic and Monetary Union’. For this purpose, details of the Interim Report are systematically evaluated. We also deal with different governance visions emerging from the ongoing euro area crisis and starts from different views of the ‘North and the South’ of the euro area on this issue. This contribution argues that there is an alternative option to the notion of cooperative fiscal federalism involving fiscal union, bailouts and debt mutualisation: competition-based fiscal federalism accompanied by a properly defined banking union. In order to be a successful one, any deal will have to come up with a successful recipe of how to (re-)create trust between European citizens and their elected governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke, 2013. "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union – Comments on a Roadmap," ROME Working Papers 201304, ROME Network.
  • Handle: RePEc:rmn:wpaper:201304

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Belke, Ansgar & Dreger, Christian, 2011. "Current account imbalances in the euro area: Catching up or competitiveness?," Discussion Papers 297, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    2. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Christian Dreger, 2013. "Current Account Imbalances in the Euro Area: Does Catching up Explain the Development?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 6-17, February.
    4. Gros, Daniel & Alcidi, Cinzia & Giovannini, Alessandro, 2012. "Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB," CEPS Papers 7160, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Daniel Gros, 1998. "Asymmetric shocks and EMU: Is there a need for a stability fund?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 33(6), pages 274-288, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2016. "Sovereign-bank linkages: Quantifying directional intensity of risk transfers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 137-164.
    2. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2015. "Bank risk behavior and connectedness in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-184.

    More about this item


    banking union; debt mutualisation; EU governance; Euro budget; Eurozone; genuine Economic and Monetary Union; North–South divide; shock absorber;

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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