Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions
How can executive agencies in developing countries implement international conventions against corruption? This paper looks at the legal issues presented by the Council of Europe, United Nations and OECD conventions against corruption; as well as the choices which executive agencies (such as the tax police, customs and border guard) in developing countries have in helping to implement these conventions. This paper reviews the potential obligations which these Conventions impose on executive agencies and the legal principles which should be enshired in executive regulation which translates these conventions into practice. This paper provides a simple legal/administrative test for corruption as well as tests for complicity, respondeat superiour, and tests which help establish jurisdiction between departments and between countries (in international corruption cases). The paper also discusses mechanisms for financing anti-corruption work, the conduct of tests or probes of civil servant bribe-taking behaviour, and the optimal fine to apply to businesses engaging in corruption as determined under a civil law standard
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