IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qeh/qehwps/qehwps150.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions

Author

Listed:
  • Bryane Michael (Linacre College)

Abstract

How can executive agencies in developing countries implement international conventions against corruption? This paper looks at the legal issues presented by the Council of Europe, United Nations and OECD conventions against corruption; as well as the choices which executive agencies (such as the tax police, customs and border guard) in developing countries have in helping to implement these conventions. This paper reviews the potential obligations which these Conventions impose on executive agencies and the legal principles which should be enshired in executive regulation which translates these conventions into practice. This paper provides a simple legal/administrative test for corruption as well as tests for complicity, respondeat superiour, and tests which help establish jurisdiction between departments and between countries (in international corruption cases). The paper also discusses mechanisms for financing anti-corruption work, the conduct of tests or probes of civil servant bribe-taking behaviour, and the optimal fine to apply to businesses engaging in corruption as determined under a civil law standard

Suggested Citation

  • Bryane Michael (Linacre College), "undated". "Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions," QEH Working Papers qehwps150, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
    • Handle: RePEc:qeh:qehwps:qehwps150
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://workingpapers.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps150.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pollitt, Christopher & Girre, Xavier & Lonsdale, Jeremy & Mul, Robert & Summa, Hilkka & Waerness, Marit, 1999. "Performance or Compliance?: Performance Audit and Public Management in Five Countries," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296003.
    2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    3. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December.
    4. Serge-Christophe Kolm, 2002. "Modern Theories of Justice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611805, December.
    5. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
    6. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    7. Cheryl W. Gray & James H. Anderson, 2006. "Anticorruption in Transition 3 : Who is Succeeding... and Why?," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7089.
    8. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    9. Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1997. "Corruption and the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 12, April.
    10. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    11. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2003. "Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(2), pages 377-411, August.
    12. Abbott, Kenneth W & Snidal, Duncan, 2002. "Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 141-178, January.
    13. Philippa Webb, 2005. "The United Nations Convention Against Corruption," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 191-229, March.
    14. Smith, Rogers M., 1988. "Political Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 89-108, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, March.
    2. Robson Fernandes Soares & Edson Ronaldo Guarido Filho, 2021. "Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 25(6), pages 190149-1901.
    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Ogus, Anthony, 2005. "Towards Appropriate Institutional Arrangements for Regulation in Less Developed Countries," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30644, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    6. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Grubiak, Kevin & Werner, Katharina, 2023. "Intrinsic Motivation vs. Corruption? Experimental Evidence on the Performance of Officials," MPRA Paper 118153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank supervision and corruption in lending," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 2131-2163, November.
    9. Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Criminal solicitation, entrapment, and the enforcement of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 258-268.
    10. Meerza, Syed Imran Ali & Giannakas, Konstantinos & Yiannaka, Amalia, 2021. "Optimal Policy Response to Food Fraud," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 46(3), September.
    11. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    12. Gomez, Fernando & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Civil and criminal sanctions against blackmail: an economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 475-498, May.
    13. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2009. "Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 28-46, March.
    14. Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2014. "Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 202-215.
    15. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano, 2010. "Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1104-1132, September.
    16. Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
    17. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano & Michele Polo, 2006. "Norm Flexibility and Private Initiative," Working Papers 314, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    18. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    19. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2015. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    20. Berardino Cesi & Alessio D’Amato & Mariangela Zoli, 2019. "Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(1), pages 65-78, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qeh:qehwps:qehwps150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: IT Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/qehoxuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.