Je uplácení dobrá cesta k efektivnějšímu vymáhání práva?
The economic theory of the last decades deals with how certain models of institutions and incentives could improve the coordination of individual actions in society. Setting rules regulating relationships between economic agents is considered as the key requirement of such coordination. Nevertheless, the rule has no impact if it is not enforced. Gary Becker and George Stigler suggest a solution that could significantly contribute to efficiency in law enforcement. Gordon Tullock does not agree with their idea. The aim of the paper is to analyze their arguments and to answer the question: "Is Becker's and Stigler's recommendation a good way to efficiency in law enforcement?" The discussion presented in this paper suggests that Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal might improve efficiency in law enforcement if certain institutional conditions are assumed. Nevertheless, Gordon Tullock assumes different institutional conditions; therefore, he rejects Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal.
Volume (Year): 2011 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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- Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
- William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
- Gordon Tullock, 1996. "Corruption Theory And Practice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 6-13, 07.
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