Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l'économie du risque
[The "judicial risk" and lay-offs in France from the point of view of the economics of uncertainty]
Does dismissal law create a "judicial risk" to which french firms are exposed? The paper discusses the different arguments (Blanchard and Tirole (2003), Cahuc and Kramarz (2004), Munoz-Perez and Serverin (2005)) using the empirical available evidence together with basic tools in economics of uncertainty. We show that data on jugement appeals in front of Prud'Hommes suggest that employees exhibit a less risk averse attitude (and to the limit, they behave in fact in a risk seeking way) than usually observed on markets for risk (such as financial or insurance markets). On the other hand, we show that the motive called in french dismissal law "personal motive" is not perceived as better than the "economic motive" soon as firms are supposed to behave in a risk averse way. Conversally, when we compare the expected cost of a dismissal associated to each motive, we find that the result of the comparison is very sensible to the employee' seniority, to the rejection rate of employees' demand in front of the Prud'Hommes, and/or to the indirect cost of the dismissal.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003.
"Are judges biased by labor market conditions?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October.
- Tversky, Amos & Wakker, Peter, 1995. "Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1255-80, November.
- Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
- Francis Kramarz & Marie-Laure Michaud, 2002.
"The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs,"
2002-38, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Kramarz, Francis & Michaud, Marie-Laure, 2004. "The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs," IZA Discussion Papers 1170, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kramarz, Francis & Michaud, Marie-Laure, 2003. "The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 3685, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Abowd, John M. & Kramarz, Francis, 2003.
"The costs of hiring and separations,"
Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 499-530, October.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
- Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1987. "Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 347-52, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.