Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties
This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-trial negotiations. Then, we analyze the comparative static of the model and the effects of alternative fee-shfting rules. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the representation of litigants’ preferences, and of the existence of the optimistic bias (or self-serving bias). JEL Classification: D81, K42.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2008|
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