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Normes prudentielles et risques bancaires : une analyse économétrique des implications sur la structure du marché bancaire dans la CEMAC
[Prudential Standards and Banking Risks: An Econometric Analysis of Implications on the structure of the banking market in CEMAC]

Author

Listed:
  • Djimoudjiel, Djekonbe

Abstract

This article is particularly interested in highlighting the effect of banking capital variation on the management of banking risk and simultaneously on the banking market structure in CEMAC countries between 2000 and 2015. The use of Generalized Method of Moments and Three-Stage Least Squares concludes that reduction of risk defaults and losses by banking capital revaluation is more pronounced among national and international banks. However, this recapitalization affects the structure of the banking market of CEMAC so as to strengthen the banking concentration. In the same light, the respect of prudential ratios generally encourages excessive banking risk taking compelling credit supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Djimoudjiel, Djekonbe, 2018. "Normes prudentielles et risques bancaires : une analyse économétrique des implications sur la structure du marché bancaire dans la CEMAC [Prudential Standards and Banking Risks: An Econometric Analysis of Implications on the structure of the banki," MPRA Paper 88411, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:88411
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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