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Bank capital regulation, loan contracts, and corporate investment

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  • Dietrich, Diemo
  • Hauck, Achim

Abstract

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.

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  • Dietrich, Diemo & Hauck, Achim, 2014. "Bank capital regulation, loan contracts, and corporate investment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 230-241.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:54:y:2014:i:2:p:230-241
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2013.10.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Ralf Bebenroth & Diemo Dietrich & Uwe Vollmer, 2009. "Bank regulation and supervision in bank-dominated financial systems: a comparison between Japan and Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 177-209, April.
    2. Blum, Ulrich, 2007. "Wer die Norm hat, hat den Markt: europäische Normung im Druckkessel," Wirtschaft im Wandel, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), vol. 13(10), pages 375-380.
    3. Knedlik, Tobias & Ströbel, Johannes, 2007. "Die Rolle von Kredit-Ratings im Rahmen der Bankenregulierung. Kredit-Ratings antizipieren Währungsrisiken unzureichend," Wirtschaft im Wandel, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), vol. 13(10), pages 380-384.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial contracting; Corporate investment; Asset tangibility; Bank capital regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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