Федеральное Агенство Развития. Оно Необходимо Для Разработки И Реализации Успешных Стратегий
[Federal development agency. It is necessary to design and implement successful strategies]
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References listed on IDEAS
- Chenggang Xu, 2011.
"The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
- Chenggang Xu, 2024. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," CEMA Working Papers 621, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
catch-up development; economic growth; indicative planning; long-term strategy; system of projects; national innovation system; technology transfer;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
- O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CIS-2018-03-05 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-TRA-2018-03-05 (Transition Economics)
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