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An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study

  • Hichri, Pavel
  • Hichri, Walid

We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individuals can contribute several times; at any moment they can see the total amount collected; at the end of the period, the public good is provided if the amount covers the cost. We find that the ability of the mechanism to provide efficiently the public good decreases with the amount of the provision cost.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 7884.

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Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision: 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7884
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  1. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 2008. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  2. Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D. & Poe, Gregory L., 1997. "Voluntary Revelation Of The Demand For Public Goods Using A Provision Point Mechanism," Working Papers 7265, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
  3. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
  4. W. Hichri, 2004. "Interior collective optimum in a voluntary contribution to a public-goods game," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 135-140.
  5. Gradstein, Mark, 1992. "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 581-97, June.
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