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Corruption in India: A Quantitative Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Borooah, Vani

Abstract

This paper represents one of the first attempts at quantifying the level of corruption in India. This was made possible by the unique website ipaidabribe.com which invites people who paid a bribe to record their experience. By choosing a specific issue - identity verification by a police officer prior to issuing a passport - it was able to focus on a "harassment" bribe: a bribe paid for something a person was legally entitled to. Nearly half the persons using this website to report "passport verification" bribes were from the eight major Indian cities of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, and Ahmedabad. This fact is, perhaps, less an indication of the concentration of corruption in these cities and more of the greater propensity of metropolitan residents to record their grievances. Of these cities, residents of New Delhi had to pay the largest amounts, and residents of Ahmedabad the smallest, in passport verification bribes.

Suggested Citation

  • Borooah, Vani, 2011. "Corruption in India: A Quantitative Analysis," MPRA Paper 75671, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75671
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Basu, Kaushik, 2011. "Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe should be Treated as Legal," MPRA Paper 50335, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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