Representation without taxation, taxation without consent; the legacy of Spanish colonialism in America

The article examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long run development of Spanish America. It surveys the fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative fiscal and trade burden imposed by colonialism. Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrained de facto governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely defined representation for subjects and territories and troubled their aggregation into a modern representative polity. Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to equitably distribute costs and benefits of independence. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers realised the asymmetry between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the US are offered to qualify the legacy. Forthcoming in: Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History