IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/5351.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists

Author

Listed:
  • Beard, Rodney

Abstract

In this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate.

Suggested Citation

  • Beard, Rodney, 2007. "Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists," MPRA Paper 5351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5351
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5351/1/MPRA_paper_5351.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hugh Neary, 1997. "A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 373-388, December.
    2. Jean-Luc Migue & Richard Marceau, 1993. "Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 355-365, May.
    3. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 329-346, Springer.
    4. Beard, Rodney & Wegener, Malcolm, 2001. "Industry Structure and the Reform of the Queensland Sugar Industry: A Computational Model," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 125-137, September.
    5. Productivity Commission, 2003. "Industries, land use and water quality in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment," Others 0305001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 113-129, Springer.
    7. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-388, December.
    8. Unknown, 2003. "Industries, Land Use and Water Quality in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment," Commissioned Studies 31918, Productivity Commission.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ola Olsson & Heather Congdon Fors, 2004. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
    2. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2008. "Testing for differences in benefit transfer values between state and regional frameworks," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(2), pages 1-20.
    3. Scott Gates, 2002. "Recruitment and Allegiance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 111-130, February.
    4. Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    6. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    7. Münster, Johannes, 2004. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 4, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    8. Coggan, Anthea & Whitten, Stuart M. & Greyling, Tertius, 2010. "Preliminary principles to guide best practice water quality regulation from an economic perspective," 2010 Conference (54th), February 10-12, 2010, Adelaide, Australia 58890, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    9. Andal, Emmanuel Genesis T., 2016. "The Economic Incentives of International Conflicts: A Theoretical Exposition," Journal of Economics, Management & Agricultural Development, Journal of Economics, Management & Agricultural Development (JEMAD), vol. 2(1), June.
    10. Hajkowicz, Stefan, 2006. "Multi-attributed environmental index construction," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 122-139, April.
    11. Jill Windle & John Rolfe, 2005. "Diversification choices in agriculture: a Choice Modelling case study of sugarcane growers," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 49(1), pages 63-74, March.
    12. Jackie Robinson & Jared Dent & Rob Fearon, 2011. "Designing Suites of Incentives to Encourage Sustainable Land Management in Rural Queensland," Discussion Papers Series 452, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    13. John Rolfe & Jill Windle, 2008. "Testing for differences in benefit transfer values between state and regional frameworks," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(2), pages 149-168, June.
    14. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Shilova, Nadezhda V. (Шилова, Надежда), 2016. "Rentseeking Behavior in Systems with a Complex Structure [Рентоориентированное Поведение В Системах Со Сложной Структурой]," Working Papers 2272, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    15. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2010. "Comparing a best management practice scorecard with an auction metric to select proposals in a water quality tender," 2010 Conference (54th), February 10-12, 2010, Adelaide, Australia 59262, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    16. Jean-Paul Azam, 2006. "The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 15(1), pages 26-58, March.
    17. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    18. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2003. "Beyond the Good and the Evil: Anarchy, Commitment, and Peace," IDEI Working Papers 195, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    19. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2005. "Valuing options for reserve water in the Fitzroy Basin," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-24.
    20. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Ola Olsson, 0. "Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 17(suppl_1), pages -109.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; Environmental economics; Agricultural policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5351. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.