IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking


  • Jean-Luc Migue
  • Richard Marceau


In assessing the impact of pollution taxes and subsidies against the reference grid of a Coasean system of property rights assignment, the authors show that both policy tools give rise to rent seeking and nonoptimal results. In contrast to the conventional analysis of environment policy, congestion, entry by subsidized polluters, political competition for a share of the general public fund, and migration to regions endowed in environmental resources are seen as sources of rent dissipation to be subtracted from the welfare gain of pollution-control policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Luc Migue & Richard Marceau, 1993. "Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 355-365, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:2:p:355-65

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Atashbar, Tohid, 2012. "Illusion therapy: How to impose an economic shock without social pain," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 99-111.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:2:p:355-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.