Efficacy of a Bidder Training Program: Lessons from LINC
In an effort to accommodate a change in the U.S. Federal Highway Administration's goals towards "race-neutral methods" concerning the involvement of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in procurement contracting, the Texas Department of Transportation created a Learning, Information, Networking and Collaboration (LINC) bidder training program. We examine the costs, benefits, and efficacy of this program using ten years of data, leveraging firm-specific bidding patterns with participation dates. We study participation, entry and bidding patterns of LINC-trained relative to untrained firms. We also analyze market power effects and the survival rates of LINC graduates.
|Date of creation:||06 Nov 2013|
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