Corruption, Pricing of Public Services and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage
The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In such an economy given its perception about the extent of leakage the government sets the price of public services required for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the economy. We show that the corruption persists at the equilibrium. The government prices its services at a level higher than their unit cost of provision in high leakage economies. However, the price falls to unit cost level in more prosperous economies. We also find that the number of entrepreneurs starting business and the total income received as bribe are non-increasing functions of the prosperity level and the extent of leakage from the economy. The predictions of the model generate interesting policy implications: for example it clearly shows that in low prosperity economies the control of leakage may induce higher level of corruption, while the opposite is true in the high prosperity economies.
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