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How to effectively control vertical collusion in bidding for government investment projects-Based on fsQCA method

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  • Chongsen Ma
  • Yun Chen
  • Wenxi Zhu
  • Liang Ou

Abstract

The impact of collusion during the bidding processes of Chinese government investment projects is a major concern in academic and policy circles, as collusion breeds corruption and destroys the credibility of governments. Furthermore, it negatively impacts successful project completion, leading to cost overruns and the illegitimate enrichment of colluding agents, regardless of the intended social benefits. Using data from 166 selected regional policy implementations as the research sample, this paper uses the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method to conduct a group analysis of typical cases. The purpose of this study is to identify and better understand the cooperative regional policy implementation environments in China and to identify effective methods to improve the governance quality of collusion controls in construction investment project bidding processes. Five key control paths are identified, covering 94% of the cases. It is also found that in lower social collusion situations, reasonable market competition regulations can directly reduce collusive behavior. The research results will help the government to formulate more adaptive control policies and promote high-quality development of government investment projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Chongsen Ma & Yun Chen & Wenxi Zhu & Liang Ou, 2022. "How to effectively control vertical collusion in bidding for government investment projects-Based on fsQCA method," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(9), pages 1-15, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0274002
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0274002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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