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Recovering from the Global Financial Crisis: achieving financial stability in times of uncertainty

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  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

Why are some global financial crises more difficult to recover from and overcome than others? What steps are necessary in ensuring that financial stability and recovery is facilitated? What kind of environment has the previous financial environment evolved to and what kind of financial products have also contributed to greater vulnerability in the triggering of systemic risks? These are amongst some of the questions which this book attempts to address. In highlighting the role and importance of various actors in post crises reforms and the huge impacts certain factors and products have contributed in exacerbating the magnitude and speed of transmission of financial contagion, it also provides an insight into why global financial crises have become more complicated to address than was previously the case. As well as considering and highlighting why matters related to pro cyclicality and capital measures should not constitute the sole focus of attention of the G20's initiatives, the book is aimed at identifying other important issues such as liquidity risks and requirements which have constituted, to a large extent, the focus of international standard setters and regulators. It also aims to direct regulators, central bank officials and supervisors, academics, business and legal professionals and other relevant interested parties in the field to current and previously ignored issues such as the "cartelisation" of capital markets. The need and concern for increased regulation of bond, equity markets, as well as other complex financial instruments which can be traded in OTC (Over-the-Counter) derivatives markets is evidenced by Basel III's focus. "Cartelisation" and organised activities relating to rate rigging in global capital markets have been evidenced recently by sophisticated EURIBOR and LIBOR rate rigging practices and occurences. The aims and objectives of the book would not be complete by merely identifying and highlighting the general root causes of global financial crises, and current issues to be focussed on. Hence each chapter will also recommend (as well as highlight) measures which should be (and have been) put forward in order to address the issues and factors which contribute to the magnitude and severity of global financial crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2013. "Recovering from the Global Financial Crisis: achieving financial stability in times of uncertainty," MPRA Paper 47350, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47350
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Otero, Jesus & Ramirez, Manuel, 2006. "Inflation before and after central bank independence: The case of Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 168-182, February.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability; pro cyclicality; supervisors; systemic risks; counter party risks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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