Corporate Governance, Affirmative Action and Firm Value in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Simultaneous Equation Approach
The post-Apartheid South African corporate governance (CG) model is a unique hybridisation of the traditional Anglo-American and Continental European-Asian CG models, distinctively requiring firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. This paper examines the association between a composite CG index and firm value in this distinct corporate setting within a simultaneous equation framework. Using a sample of post-Apartheid South African listed corporations, and controlling for potential interdependencies among block ownership, board size, leverage, institutional ownership, firm value and a broad CG index, we find a significant positive association between a composite CG index and firm value. Further, our two-stage least squares results show that there is also a reverse association between our broad CG index and firm value, emphasising the need for future research to adequately control for potential interrelationships between possible alternative CG mechanisms and firm value. Distinct from prior studies, we find that compliance with affirmative action CG provisions impacts positively on firm value. Our results are consistent with agency, legitimacy, political cost, and resource dependence theoretical predictions. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that adequately control for different types of endogeneity problems, and alternative accounting, and market-based firm valuation proxies.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2013|
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- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Graham Barr & Jos Gerson & Brian Kantor, 1995. "Shareholders As Agents And Principals: The Case For South Africa'S Corporate Governance System," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32.
- Stefan Beiner & Wolfgang Drobetz & Markus M. Schmid & Heinz Zimmermann, 2006. "An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(2), pages 249-283.
- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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