IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/42150.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pollution abatement and reservation prices in a market game

Author

Listed:
  • Halkos, George
  • Papageorgiou, George

Abstract

In this paper we set up an oligopolistic market model, where firms invest in pollution abatement in order to increase the whole market size via an increase in the consumers’ reservation price. Moreover, we suppose that the demand function is not a linear one and the resulting game is not a usual linear quadratic one. In the considered model we investigate the open loop, the memory less closed-loop and the collusive patterns equilibrium. Additionally, we examine the social planning perspective. In the case of a convex demand we found the surprising result that the control and state variables have higher values in the open-loop steady state equilibrium than in the closed loop, while in a linear demand case the equilibrium is undetermined. In all cases we find that only if the market demand has concave curvature are the conclusions clear. A number of propositions and remarks are provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2012. "Pollution abatement and reservation prices in a market game," MPRA Paper 42150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42150
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42150/1/MPRA_paper_42150.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Naimzada, Ahmad K. & Sbragia, Lucia, 2006. "Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions: Two boundedly rational adjustment processes," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 707-722.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
    3. Anderson, Simon P & Engers, Maxim, 1994. "Strategic Investment and Timing of Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 833-853, November.
    4. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2003. "Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 61-81, January.
    5. Stanisław Bylka & Stanisław Ambroszkiewicz & Jan Komar, 2000. "Discrete time dynamic game model for price competition in an oligopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 69-89, December.
    6. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    7. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2002. "Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(1), pages 123-136.
    8. Forster, Bruce A., 1980. "Optimal energy use in a polluted environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 321-333, December.
    9. George E. Halkos & George J. Papageorgiou, 2012. "Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 14-37, March.
    10. Kennedy Peter W., 1994. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-63, July.
    11. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    12. Anna Nagurney & Kanwalroop Dhanda, 2000. "Noncompliant oligopolistic firms and marketable pollution permits: Statics and dynamics," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 285-312, January.
    13. George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
    14. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    15. George Halkos, 1996. "Incomplete information in the acid rain game," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 129-148, June.
    16. Halkos, George E., 1993. "Sulphur abatement policy: Implications of cost differentials," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1035-1043, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. George Halkos & George Papageorgiou, 2013. "Dynamic modeling of pulse fishing: A game theoretic approach," DEOS Working Papers 1324, Athens University of Economics and Business.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Halkos, George & Kitsos, Christos, 2018. "Mathematics vs. Statistics in tackling Environmental Economics uncertainty," MPRA Paper 85280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. George E. Halkos & Dimitra C. Kitsou, 2018. "Weighted location differential tax in environmental problems," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, January.
    3. Halkos, George, 2009. "A Differential game approach in the case of a polluting oligopoly," MPRA Paper 23742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. George, Halkos E. & George, Papageorgiou J. & Emmanuel, Halkos G. & John, Papageorgiou G., 2019. "Environmental regulation and economic cycles," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 172-177.
    5. Halkos, George & Managi, Shunsuke & Tsilika, Kyriaki, 2018. "Spatiotemporal distribution of inclusive wealth data: An illustrated guide," MPRA Paper 85711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. George Halkos & Shunsuke Managi & Kyriaki Tsilika, 2018. "Measuring air polluters’ responsibility in transboundary pollution networks," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(3), pages 619-639, July.
    7. Halkos, George, 2000. "Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices?," MPRA Paper 42849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Halkos, George, 2018. "Environment and Sustainable Development," MPRA Paper 86490, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Halkos, George & Kitsos, Christos, 2018. "Uncertainty in environmental economics: The problem of entropy and model choice," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 127-140.
    10. Halkos, George & Tsilika, Kyriaki, 2017. "Computational analysis of source receptor air pollution problems," MPRA Paper 77305, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2016. "Optimal abatement and taxation for internalizing externalities: A dynamic game with feedback strategies," MPRA Paper 74467, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Halkos, George & Barmpoudaki, Kyriaki & Voulagkas, George & Tsilika, Kyriaki, 2018. "Exploring the EMEP Input-Output model of air pollution," MPRA Paper 90267, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Halkos, George & Kitsou, Dimitra, 2014. "A weighted location differential tax method in environmental problems," MPRA Paper 59502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. George E. Halkos & Kyriaki D. Tsilika, 2021. "Towards Better Computational Tools for Effective Environmental Policy Planning," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 58(3), pages 555-572, October.
    15. Denis Claude & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2008. "Short-run stick and long-run carrot policy: the role of initial conditions," Working Papers 08-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
    16. Claudio Piga, 2003. "Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 343-359, November.
    17. Roberto Cellini & Luca Lambertini, 2011. "R&D Incentives Under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 387-400, September.
    18. Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2011. "Environmental policy and stable collusion: The case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 479-490, April.
    19. Dragone Davide & Tampieri Alessandro & Lambertini Luca & Palestini Arsen, 2013. "On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 25-34, October.
    20. N. Baris Vardar & Georges Zaccour, 2020. "Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-28, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly Game; non-linear demand; pollution abatement; reservation price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.