Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe
This study presents a mathematical model for determining cost-effective emissions' control strategies in Europe, by minimizing sulphur abatement costs subject to different pollution control targets. The purpose is to compare the efficiency of a uniform percentage emissions reduction with a scenario that takes variation in environmental conditions into account. Underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost-benefit analysis of acid rain abatement is infeasible. The model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an estimation of the gains (or losses) that countries could achieve if they co-operate in their policies rather than act independently. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994
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Volume (Year): 4 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Andersson, Thomas, 1991. "Government failure -- the cause of global environmental mismanagement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 215-236, December.
- George Halkos & John Hutton, . "Acid Rain Games in Europe," Discussion Papers 93/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
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