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Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe

Author

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  • Halkos, G.E.

Abstract

Acid rain causes greater environmental damage than would occur if countries act cooperatively. Based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions, the potential gains from cooperation are calculated for Europe. Various cooperative abatement rates are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements. The distinction is made between primary and secondary abatement, and their respective roles are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Halkos, G.E., 1994. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe," MPRA Paper 33943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33943
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33943/1/MPRA_paper_33943.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    2. Newbery, David M, 1993. "The Impact of EC Environmental Policy on British Coal," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 66-95, Winter.
    3. Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Heal, Geoffrey, 1992. "International negotiations on emission control," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 223-240, December.
    5. Welsch Heinz, 1993. "An Equilibrium Framework for Global Pollution Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 64-79, July.
    6. Andersson, Thomas, 1991. "Government failure -- the cause of global environmental mismanagement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 215-236, December.
    7. George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
    8. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Halkos, George & Kitsos, Christos, 2018. "Mathematics vs. Statistics in tackling Environmental Economics uncertainty," MPRA Paper 85280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Halkos, George, 2013. "Uncertainty in optimal pollution levels: Modeling the benefit area," MPRA Paper 47768, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Management; abatement; acid rain; cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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