A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Endres, Alfred, 1997. "Negotiating a climate convention: The role of prices and quantities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 147-156, March.
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2002. "Balanced Environmental Games," Working Papers in Economics 17/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Honkatukia, Juha & Ollikainen, Markku, 2001. "Towards Efficient Pollution Control in the Baltic Sea. An anatomy of current failure with suggestions," Discussion Papers 755, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution," Working papers 143, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Kristen A. Sheeran, 2006. "Side Payments of Exceptions: The Implications for Equitable and Efficient Climate Control," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 515-532, Summer.
- Tae-Yeoun Lee, 2001. "Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February.
- Halkos, G.E., 1994. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe," MPRA Paper 33943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rudolf Kerschbamer & Nina Maderner, 2001. "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 343-360, August.
- George Halkos, 1996. "Incomplete information in the acid rain game," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 129-148, June.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:24:y:1993:i:1:p:87-100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.