IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v18y2001i2p193-218.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Tae-Yeoun Lee

    ()

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two-countrymodel. We analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants. Our analysis shows that when the atmosphere istaken as a pure public goods, ``a strong paradox'' emerges:the advanced country, in spite of the transfer, seesits economic welfare improved while the developingcountry sees it worsen. Moreover, if both a technicaland an income transfer occur, this paradox mightnot be solved. Furthermore, ``a paradoxicalimprovement'' occurs when the advanced country does nottake any policy towards the environment but thedeveloping country does: an improvement in the levelof technology in the developing country allows for anexpansion of the level of utility in both countries.On the other hand, in the case where the atmosphere istaken as an impure public goods, when both countriespursue an abatement policy, the transfer of technologyleads to an improvement in welfare in bothcountries. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Suggested Citation

  • Tae-Yeoun Lee, 2001. "Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:193-218
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011131310523
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1011131310523
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
    2. Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Sargent, Keith, 1997. "A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 281-301, May.
    3. Cesar, Herman S. J., 1993. "International cooperation and technology transfers in the case of the Greenhouse Effect," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 163-181, June.
    4. Andreoni, James & McGuire, Martin C., 1993. "Identifying the free riders : A simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 447-454, July.
    5. Niho, Yoshio, 1996. "Effects of an international income transfer on the global environmental quality," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-410, December.
    6. Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
    7. John Stranlund, 1996. "On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-22, February.
    8. Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 755-787.
    9. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1994. "The comparative static properties of the impure public good model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 403-421, July.
    10. Marjit, Sugata, 1990. "On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 293-298, July.
    11. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
    12. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nagase, Yoko & Silva, Emilson C.D., 2007. "Acid rain in China and Japan: A game-theoretic analysis," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 100-120, January.
    2. Matthieu Glachant & Julie Ing & Jean Philippe Nicolai, 2017. "The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(3), pages 435-456, March.
    3. Gunter Stephan & Georg Müller-Fürstenberger, 2012. "Global Warming, Technology Transfer and Trade in Carbon Energy: Challenge or Threat?," Diskussionsschriften dp1206, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Hattori, Keisuke, 2007. "Policy and Product Differentiations Encourage the International Transfer of Environmental Technologies," MPRA Paper 6334, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Sep 2007.
    5. Gunter Stephan & Georg Müller-Fürstenberger, 2015. "Global Warming, Technological Change and Trade in Carbon Energy: Challenge or Threat?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 791-809, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:193-218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.