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Public goods and public bads

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Richard Cornes
  • Dirk Rübbelke

Abstract

In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways. Whereas for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach, we analyze a general model in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results with respect to redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition formation, and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto‐optimal solution, highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Dirk Rübbelke, 2018. "Public goods and public bads," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 525-540, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:4:p:525-540
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12298
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Heyen & Alessandro Tavoni, 2025. "Public GoBs," CESifo Working Paper Series 11736, CESifo.
    2. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "A Subscription vs. Appropriation Framework for Natural Resource Conflicts," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Anil Markandya & Dirk Rübbelke (ed.), CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT, chapter 9, pages 257-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Bedřich Moldan, 2022. "Vládnutí globálním společným statkům v éře antropocénu [Governance of Global Common Goods in the Era of Anthropocene]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2022(4), pages 500-526.
    4. Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2024. "A Rent-Seeking Perspective on Imperial Peace," IZA Discussion Papers 17312, IZA Network @ LISER.
    5. Todd Sandler, 2018. "Collective action and geoengineering," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 105-125, March.
    6. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2025. "Agreeing on public goods or bads," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    7. Bakshi, Dripto & Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2022. "Can extremism reduce conflict?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    8. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova & Lian Xue, 2019. "Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 903-922, October.
    9. Alexis Poindron & Nizar Allouch, 2024. "A Model of Competing Gangs in Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-15, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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