A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems
This paper provides a model that attempts to deal with the transboundary nature of the acid rain problem, using a game theoretic approach consistent with mainstream economic theory. The general forms of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in the explicit and implicit set-up of the model are presented under the assumptions of deterministic and stochastic deposits.
|Date of creation:||1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Hoel, M., 1989.
"Global Environmental Problems: The Effects Of Unilateral Actions Taken By One Country,"
11/1989, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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- George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
- Jason Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 1991. "Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 195-214, June.
- Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
- George Halkos & John Hutton, . "Acid Rain Games in Europe," Discussion Papers 93/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Halkos, G.E., 1994. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe," MPRA Paper 33943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Harrison, Glenn W & Rutstrom, E E, 1991. "Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(406), pages 420-35, May.
- McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
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