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Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices?

  • Halkos, George

In this study, a basic comparison between the Pigouvian and the Coasean approaches is carried out in order to discuss and comment on the mechanisms by which externalities are resolved. Environmental control approaches are examined and compared in terms of minimization of abatement costs, development of new technologies, revenue-generating capacity, complexity, popularity, incentives to cheat and inflation and adjustment costs. It seems that economic instruments have several advantages over regulations: they are less rigid and static, they are cost-effective, provide a source of finance and encourage innovation. However, market mechanisms do not invalidate regulatory approaches; they are, and must be, an adjunct to them.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42849/1/MPRA_paper_42849.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 42849.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Publication status: Published in Archieves of Economic History XIV.2(2002): pp. 61-82
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42849
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Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

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  1. Oates, Wallace E & Portney, Paul R & McGartland, Albert M, 1989. "The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1233-42, December.
  2. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
  3. M. L. Weitzman, 1973. "Prices vs. Quantities," Working papers 106, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Jaffe, Adam B. & Newell, Richard G. & Stavins, Robert N., 2003. "Chapter 11 Technological change and the environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 461-516 Elsevier.
  5. Halkos, George, 1993. "Economic incentives for optimal sulphur abatement in Europe," MPRA Paper 33705, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Besanko, David, 1987. "Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 19-44, October.
  8. Halkos, George E., 1993. "Sulphur abatement policy: Implications of cost differentials," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1035-1043, October.
  9. George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
  10. Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Helm, Dieter & Pearce, David W, 1990. "Assessment: Economic Policy towards the Environment," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-16, Spring.
  12. Hettelingh, Jean-Paul & Hordijk, Leen, 1986. "Environmental Conflicts: The Case of Acid Rain in Europe," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 38-52, November.
  13. Newbery, David M G, 1990. "Acid Rain," CEPR Discussion Papers 442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. George Halkos & John Hutton, . "Acid Rain Games in Europe," Discussion Papers 93/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
  15. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
  16. Tietenberg, T H, 1990. "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 17-33, Spring.
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