Economic incentives for optimal sulphur abatement in Europe
This paper reviews and develops a theoretical and empirical representation of economic incentives for the implementation of pollution control strategies. A number of alternative available economic instruments may be thought of which, if applied internationally, could encourage implementation of the desired abatement strategies by countries. The paper considers means of pushing the countries to minimize abatement cost with them. A comparison between the pollution targets achieved by the imposition of a uniform charge rate and by differentiated charge rates is discussed and empirical results are provided with associated conclusions. These results are then compared with a simple standards setting in the form of critical loads, in order to see in an empirical way if economic instruments work better than regulations.
|Date of creation:||1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Energy Sources 5.17(1995): pp. 517-534|
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Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Tietenberg, T H, 1990. "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 17-33, Spring.
- Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Besanko, David, 1987. "Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 19-44, October.
- Weitzman, Martin L, 1974.
"Prices vs. Quantities,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October.
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