Optimal sulphur emissions abatement in Europe
This study presents a mathematical model for determining cost effective emissions' control strategies in Europe, by minimizing sulphur abatement costs subject to different pollution control targets. The purpose is to compare the efficiency of a uniform percentage emissions reduction with a scenario that takes variation in environmental conditions into account. Some alternative criteria for re allocating abatement costs between countries are considered, to see which countries are penalized and which are favoured by the proposed approaches, and which approaches should be "preferred" on efficiency grounds. Underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost-benefit analysis of acid rain abatement is infeasible. The model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an estimation of the gains (or losses) that countries could achieve if they co-operate in their policies rather than act independently.
|Date of creation:||1993|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- George Halkos & John Hutton, "undated". "Acid Rain Games in Europe," Discussion Papers 93/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Andersson, Thomas, 1991. "Government failure -- the cause of global environmental mismanagement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 215-236, December.
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