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Noncompliant oligopolistic firms and marketable pollution permits: Statics and dynamics

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  • Anna Nagurney
  • Kanwalroop Dhanda

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the modeling, analysis, and computation of solutions to both static and dynamic models of multiproduct, multipollutant noncompliant oligopolistic firms who engage in a market for pollution permits. In the case of the static model, we utilize variational inequality theory for the formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions as well as the qualitative analysis of the equilibrium pattern, including sensitivity analysis. We then propose a dynamic model, using the theory of projected dynamical systems, whose set of stationary points coincides with the set of solutions to the variational inequality problem. We propose an algorithm, which is a discretization in time of the dynamic adjustment process, and provide convergence results using the stability analysis results that are also provided herein. Finally, we apply the algorithm to several numerical examples to compute the profit-maximized quantities of the oligopolistic firms' products and the quantities of emissions, along with the equilibrium allocation of licenses and their prices, as well as the possible noncompliant overflows and underflows. This is the first time that these methodologies have been utilized in conjunction to study a problem drawn from environmental policy modeling and analysis. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Nagurney & Kanwalroop Dhanda, 2000. "Noncompliant oligopolistic firms and marketable pollution permits: Statics and dynamics," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 285-312, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:95:y:2000:i:1:p:285-312:10.1023/a:1018906225220
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018906225220
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2012. "Pollution abatement and reservation prices in a market game," MPRA Paper 42150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Vyacheslav Kalashnikov & Vladimir Bulavsky & Vitaliy Kalashnikov & Nataliya Kalashnykova, 2014. "Structure of demand and consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) in a mixed oligopoly model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 281-297, June.
    3. E. Allevi & A. Gnudi & I. V. Konnov & G. Oggioni, 2018. "Evaluating the effects of environmental regulations on a closed-loop supply chain network: a variational inequality approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 261(1), pages 1-43, February.
    4. Tajbakhsh, Alireza & Hassini, Elkafi, 2022. "A game-theoretic approach for pollution control initiatives," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
    5. Ma-Lin Song & Wei Zhang & Xiao-Ming Qiu, 2015. "Emissions trading system and supporting policies under an emissions reduction framework," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 228(1), pages 125-134, May.
    6. Giovanni Crespi, 2001. "The effect of economic policy in oligopoly. A variational inequality approach," Departmental Working Papers 2001-09, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    7. E. Allevi & A. Gnudi & I. V. Konnov & G. Oggioni, 2018. "Decomposition method for oligopolistic competitive models with common environmental regulation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 441-467, September.

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