From neuro-Hayekians to subjectivist Hayekians: a reply to Horwitz and Koppl
We recognize the comments made by Horwitz (2010) and Koppl (2010) in their replies to D'Amico and Boettke (2010), "Making Sense out of The Sensory Order." Furthermore, this paper hopes to explain what role D'Amico and Boettke do see for cognitive neuroscience in the study of Austrian Economics. Some brief summary comments are presented. Then a general framework of individual learning and its effects upon social institutions and economic processes is described by referring to Cowan and Rizzo (1996) and Denzau and North (1994).
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- Peter Boettke & J. Robert Subrick, 2001. "From the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of the market," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 53-64.
- Boettke, Peter J, 2002. " Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of its Uniqueness," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 263-74, December.
- Denzau, Arthur T & North, Douglass C, 1994.
"Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31.
- Cowan, Robin & Rizzo, Mario J, 1996. "The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 273-317.
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